IRAQ, A REPUBLIC
since the 1958 coup d'etat that ended the reign of King
Faisal II, became a sovereign, independent state in 1932.
Although the modern state, the Republic of Iraq, is quite
young, the history of the land and its people dates back
more than 5,000 years. Indeed, Iraq contains the world's
richest known archaeological sites. Here, in ancient
Mesopotamia (the land between the rivers), the first
civilization--that of Sumer-- appeared in the Near East.
Despite the millennium separating the two epochs, Iraqi
history displays a continuity shaped by adaptation to the
ebbings and flowings of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (in
Arabic, the Dijlis and Furat, respectively). Allowed to flow
unchecked, the rivers wrought destruction in terrible floods
that inundated whole towns. When the rivers were controlled
by irrigation dikes and other waterworks, the land became
extremely fertile. The dual nature
of the Tigris and the Euphrates--their potential to be
destructive or productive--has resulted in two distinct
legacies found throughout Iraqi history. On the one hand,
Mesopotamia's plentiful water resources and lush river
valleys allowed for the production of surplus food that
served as the basis for the civilizing trend begun at Sumer
and preserved by rulers such as Hammurabi (1792-1750 B.C.),
Cyrus (550-530 B.C.), Darius (520-485 B.C.), Alexander
(336-323 B.C.), and the Abbasids (750-1258). The ancient
cities of Sumer, Babylon, and Assyria all were located in
what is now Iraq. Surplus food production and joint
irrigation and flood control efforts facilitated the growth
of a powerful and expanding state. Mesopotamia could
also be an extremely threatening environment, however,
driving its peoples to seek security from the vicissitudes
of nature. Throughout Iraqi history, various groups have
formed autonomous, self-contained social units. Allegiance
to ancient religious deities at Ur and Eridu, membership in
the Shiat Ali (or party of Ali, the small group of followers
that supported Ali ibn Abu Talib as rightful leader of the
Islamic community in the seventh century), residence in the
asnaf (guilds) or the mahallat (city
quarters) of Baghdad under the Ottoman Turks, membership in
one of a multitude of tribes--such efforts to build
autonomous security-providing structures have exerted a
powerful centrifugal force on Iraqi culture. Two other factors
that have inhibited political centralization are the absence
of stone and Iraq's geographic location as the eastern flank
of the Arab world. For much of Iraqi history, the lack of
stone has severely hindered the building of roads. As a
result, many parts of the country have remained beyond
government control. Also, because it borders nonArab Turkey
and Iran and because of the great agricultural potential of
its river valley, Iraq has attracted waves of ethnically
diverse migrations. Although this influx of people has
enriched Iraqi culture, it also has disrupted the country's
internal balance and has led to deep-seated
schisms. Throughout Iraqi
history, the conflict between political fragmentation and
centralization has been reflected in the struggles among
tribes and cities for the food-producing flatlands of the
river valleys. When a central power neglected to keep the
waterworks in repair, land fell into disuse, and tribes
attacked settled peoples for precious and scarce
agricultural commodities. For nearly 600 years, between the
collapse of the Abbasid Empire in the thirteenth century and
the waning years of the Ottoman era in the late nineteenth
century, government authority was tenuous and tribal Iraq
was, in effect, autonomous. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, Iraq's disconnected, and often
antagonistic, ethnic, religious, and tribal social groups
professed little or no allegiance to the central government.
As a result, the all-consuming concern of contemporary Iraqi
history has been the forging of a nation-state out of this
diverse and conflict-ridden social structure and the
concomitant transformation of parochial loyalties, both
tribal and ethnic, into a national identity. Beginning in the
middle of the nineteenth century, the tanzimat
reforms (an administrative and legal reorganization of the
Ottoman Empire), the emergence of private property, and the
tying of Iraq to the world capitalist market severely
altered Iraq's social structure. Tribal shaykhs (see
Glossary) traditionally had provided both spiritual
leadership and tribal security. Land reform and increasing
links with the West transformed many shaykhs into
profit-seeking landlords, whose tribesmen became
impoverished sharecroppers. Moreover, as Western economic
penetration increased, the products of Iraq's
once-prosperous craftsmen were displaced by machine-made
British textiles. During the
twentieth century, as the power of tribal Iraq waned,
Baghdad benefited from the rise of a centralized
governmental apparatus, a burgeoning bureaucracy, increased
educational opportunities, and the growth of the oil
industry. The transformation of the urban-tribal balance
resulted in a massive rural-to-urban migration. The
disruption of existing parochial loyalties and the rise of
new class relations based on economics fueled frequent
tribal rebellions and urban uprisings during much of the
twentieth century. Iraq's social
fabric was in the throes of a destabilizing transition in
the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time,
because of its foreign roots, the Iraqi political system
suffered from a severe legitimacy crisis. Beginning with its
League of Nations Mandate in 1920, the British government
had laid out the institutional framework for Iraqi
government and politics. Britain imposed a Hashimite (also
seen as Hashemite) monarchy, defined the territorial limits
of Iraq with little correspondence to natural frontiers or
traditional tribal and ethnic settlements, and influenced
the writing of a constitution and the structure of
parliament. The British also supported narrowly based
groups--such as the tribal shaykhs--over the growing,
urban-based nationalist movement, and resorted to military
force when British interests were threatened, as in the 1941
Rashid Ali coup. Between 1918 and
1958, British policy in Iraq had farreaching effects. The
majority of Iraqis were divorced from the political process,
and the process itself failed to develop procedures for
resolving internal conflicts other than rule by decree and
the frequent use of repressive measures. Also, because the
formative experiences of Iraq's post-1958 political
leadership centered around clandestine opposition activity,
decision making and government activity in general have been
veiled in secrecy. Furthermore, because the country lacks
deeply rooted national political institutions, political
power frequently has been monopolized by a small elite, the
members of which are often bound by close family or tribal
ties. Between the
overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the emergence of
Saddam Husayn in the mid-1970s, Iraqi history was a
chronicle of conspiracies, coups, countercoups, and fierce
Kurdish uprisings. Beginning in 1975, however, with the
signing of the Algiers Agreement--an agreement between
Saddam Husayn and the shah of Iran that effectively ended
Iranian military support for the Kurds in Iraq--Saddam
Husayn was able to bring Iraq an unprecedented period of
stability. He effectively used rising oil revenues to fund
large-scale development projects, to increase public sector
employment, and significantly to improve education and
health care. This tied increasing numbers of Iraqis to the
ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party. As a
result, for the first time in contemporary Iraqi history, an
Iraqi leader successfully forged a national identity out of
Iraq's diverse social structure. Saddam Husayn's
achievements and Iraq's general prosperity, however, did not
survive long. In September 1980, Iraqi troops crossed the
border into Iran, embroiling the country in a costly
war.
Library of Congress Country Study
Library of Congress Country Study
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