The Prince
by Nicolo Machiavelli
Chapter IX
Concerning a civil principality
But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen
becomes the prince of his country, not by wickedness or any
intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellow
citizens--this may be called a civil principality: nor is
genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but
rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a
principality is obtained either by the favour of the people
or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these
two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that
the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the
nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people;
and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities
one of three results, either a principality, self-
government, or anarchy.
A principality is created either by the people or by the
nobles, accordingly as one or other of them has the
opportunity; for the nobles, seeing they cannot withstand
the people, begin to cry up the reputation of one of
themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his
shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,
finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the
reputation of one of themselves, and make him a prince so as
to be defended by his authority. He who obtains sovereignty
by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more
difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people,
because the former finds himself with many around him who
consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can
neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who
reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone,
and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to
obey him.
Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without
injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy
the people, for their object is more righteous than that of
the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the former
only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that
a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people,
because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he
can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst
that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be
abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only
to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against
him; for they, being in these affairs more far- seeing and
astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and
to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail.
Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the
same people, but he can do well without the same nobles,
being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or
wake away authority when it pleases him.
Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the
nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to
say, they either shape their course in such a way as binds
them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who so
bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured
and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt
with in two ways; they may fail to do this through
pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case
you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are
of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour
them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when
for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves,
it is a token that they are giving more thought to
themselves than to you, and a prince out to guard against
such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because
in adversity they always help to ruin him.
Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of
the people ought to keep them friendly, and this he can
easily do seeing they only ask not to be oppressed by him.
But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes a prince
by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to
seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because
men, when they receive good from him of whom they were
expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor;
thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if
he had been raised to the principality by their favours; and
the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as
these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give
fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary
for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has
no security in adversity.
Nabis,1 Prince of the
Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a
victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his
country and his government; and for the overcoming of this
peril it was only necessary for him to make himself secure
against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had
the people been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this
statement with the trite proverb that "He who builds on the
people, builds on the mud," for this is true when a private
citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that
the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies
or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very
often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to
Messer Giorgio Scali2 in
Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself
as above, who can command, and is a man of courage,
undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other
qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps
the whole people encouraged--such a one will never find
himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has
laid his foundations well.
These principalities are liable to danger when they are
passing from the civil to the absolute order of government,
for such princes either rule personally or through
magistrates. In the latter case their government is weaker
and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill
of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who,
especially in troubled times, can destroy the government
with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and
the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise
absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects,
accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a
mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will
always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can
trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes
in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state,
because then every one agrees with him; they all promise,
and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him;
but in troubled times, when the state has need of its
citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is
this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried
once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course
that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of
circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he
will always find them faithful.
1 Nabis, tyrant of Sparta,
conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed
192 B.C.
2 Messer Giorgio Scali. This event
is to be found in Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Book
III.
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by Nicolo Machiavelli
Chapter VIII
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